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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. Rodney Johnson*
The 1987 session of the General Assembly enacted legislation
dealing with wills, trusts and estates that amended fourteen sec-
tions and added three new sections to the Code of Virginia (the
"Code"). In addition to this legislation, there were five cases from
the Virginia Supreme Court during the past year that involved is-
sues of interest to both the general practitioner and the specialist
in wills, trusts, and estates. This article reviews all of these legisla-
tive and judicial developments. In order to facilitate the discussion
of numerous Code sections, they will be referred to in the text by
their section numbers only which, unless otherwise stated, will be
understood as always referring to the latest printing of the old sec-
tions and to the 1987 supplement for the new sections.
I. LEGISLATION
A. Adopted Persons Taking Under Wills or Trusts1
Prior to 1978, Virginia followed the "stranger to the adoption
rule" in dealing with the rights of adopted persons to take under a
will when they were not specifically named and the will failed to
provide a constructional clause dealing with the matter. Under this
rule a testator who used generic descriptive terminology such as
heirs, issue, descendants, sisters, uncles, etc. to describe benefi-
ciaries (other than the testator's own children) was presumed not
to intend to include within such terms those persons who were
members of the described class as a result of adoption. The ration-
ale for this rule was that the testator, being a stranger to the adop-
tion, presumably did not wish to be bound thereby.2 In 1978, the
General Assembly concluded that this rule was no longer represen-
tative of what the majority of Virginians would wish and accord-
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond: Member of the
Virginia Bar; B.A., 1965, William and Mary; J.D., 1967, William and Mary; LL.M., 1970,
New York University.
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-71.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
2. This rule, and the background of § 64.1-71.1, is discussed in Johnson, Inheritance
Rights of Children in Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L. REv. 275, 291-92 (1978).
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ingly enacted section 64.1-71.1 to provide that "[i]n the interpreta-
tion of wills and trusts, adopted persons . . . are included in class
gift terminology and terms of relationship in accordance with rules
for determining relationships for purposes of intestate succession
unless a contrary intent shall appear on the face of the will or
trust."'3 The reference to "rules for determining relationships for
purposes of intestate succession" was a reference to section
64.1-5.1 which was enacted as a part of the same legislative mea-
sure that enacted section 64.1-71.1 in 1978.4 Section 64.1-5.1 pro-
vides that anytime a relationship of parent and child must be es-
tablished5 for purposes of title 64.1, "[ain adopted person is the
child of an adopting parent"6 and thus gives the adopted person
the same status in the adoptive family that would be enjoyed if the
nexus had been a biological one. Thus, sections 64.1-5.1 and
64.1-71.1 were designed to operate together in order to give
adopted persons the same intestate and testate succession rights
throughout their adoptive families that they would have if they
were biological members thereof.
However, in the recent case of Hyman v. Glover,7 the Virginia
Supreme Court held in a 4-3 decision "that Code § 64.1-71.1 does
not operate to include adopted children within the meaning of the
word 'issue.' If the General Assembly intends for adopted children
to be included in the word 'issue,' it must say so. ' s
The 1987 session of the General Assembly responded to the
Glover decision by making a clarifying amendment to section
64.1-71.1 in order to expressly provide that "[i]n determining the
intent of a testator or settlor, adopted persons are presumptively
included in such terms as 'children,' 'issue,' 'kindred,' 'heirs,' 'rela-
tives,' 'descendants' or similar words of classification . . . . 9 Al-
though believing that this constructional rule would carry out the
intent of the majority of Virginians, the General Assembly recog-
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-71.1 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
4. 1978 Va. Acts, ch. 647.
5. It should be noted that all family relationships, other than husband and wife, are a
function of establishing one or more parent-child relationships. For example, brothers are
such only because they each have a parent-child relationship with the same mother and
father.
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1(1) (Repl. Vol. 1987).
7. 232 Va. 140, 348 S.E.2d 269 (1986). Although not originally associated with this case,
the author became co-counsel for appellee in the petition for rehearing.
8. Id. at 147, 348 S.E.2d at 273; see also infra text accompanying notes 60-69.
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-71.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
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nized that some testators would wish to restrict succession to
members of their biological family and, in order to also clarify the
law in this area, the 1987 amendment to section 64.1-71.1 further
provides that "[i]n determining the intent of a testator or settlor,
adopted persons. . . are presumptively excluded by such terms as
'natural children,' 'issue of the body,' 'blood kindred,' 'heirs of the
body,' 'blood relatives,' 'decendents of the body' [sic] or similar
words of classification."' 1 It will be noted that the root words on
this exclusive list are identical to the words on the positive list, but
that each root word on the exclusive list is modified by additional
language such as 'natural,' 'body' or 'blood,' which would rather
clearly show an intent to exclude adopted persons. Accordingly, in
interpreting wills and trusts that use generic descriptive terminol-
ogy not specifically mentioned in the statute, it would appear that
all such other terms would presumptively include adopted persons
unless these terms are similarly modified by the use of additional
language such as "natural," "body" or "blood."
A final clarifying amendment involved the replacement of the
word "and" with the word "or" in the provision: "In the interpre-
tation of wills and trusts, adopted persons . ..are included in
class gift terminology or terms of relationship in accordance with
rules for determining relationships for purposes of intestate succes-
sion unless a contrary intent shall appear on the face of the will or
trust."" The conjunctive was replaced with the disjunctive in order
to preclude any argument that the statute applied only to those
gifts involving both a class gift and generic terminology.
B. Illegitimate Persons Taking Under Wills or Trusts12
Section 64.1-71.1, discussed in the preceding section in connec-
tion with the rights of adopted persons, has also provided since
1978 that "[i]n the interpretation of wills and trusts . . . persons
born out of wedlock are included in class gift terminology and
terms of relationship in accordance with the rules for determining
relationships for purposes of intestate succession unless a contrary
intent shall appear on the face of the will or trust.' 3 In an appar-
ent response to the apprehension that a claim might be made by
10. Id.
11. Id. (emphasis added).
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-71.1 (RepI. Vol. 1987).
13. Id. § 64.1-71.1 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
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one alleging to be an illegitimate member of a class after a fiduci-
ary has distributed an estate or trust, which might expose the dis-
tributing fiduciary to a personal liability, a "good-faith" amend-
ment has been made to section 64.1-71.1 to protect such a fiduciary
from any liability. This amendment provides that
"[i]n the event that a fiduciary makes payment to members of a
class to the exclusion of persons born out of wedlock of whose claim
of paternity or maternity the fiduciary has no knowledge, the fiduci-
ary shall not be held liable to such persons for payments made prior
to knowledge of such claim.' 14
The problem addressed by this amendment is not believed to be
a significant one because of the reference in section 64.1-71.1 to
"the rules for determining relationships for purposes of intestate
succession." This is a reference to section 64.1-5.1 which provides,
with one exception,"5 that a person who has been adopted is no
longer a child of its biological parents for purposes of title 64.1.
Accordingly, as the typical illegitimate child will normally be
adopted in early infancy, its relational link with its illegitimate
parents will be severed and it will have no basis for a claim in their
testate or intestate estates or in the estates of their family
members.
C. Adopted or Illegitimate Persons Taking Under Deeds16
The General Assembly has also recognized that the interpretive
problems regarding (i) adopted persons, as discussed in part A of
this article, and (ii) illegitimate persons, as discussed in part B of
this article, might arise in the case of grantors who were using
deeds as will substitutes. Therefore, new section 55-49.1 was added
by the 1987 session to provide the same rules for the interpretation
of such deeds as section 64.1-71.1 provides for wills and trusts.
14. Id. § 64.1-71.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
15. Id. § 64.1-5.1.(1) (Repl. Vol. 1987) provides that "[a]n adopted person is the child of
an adopting parent and not of the biological parents, except that adoption of a child by the
spouse of a biological parent has no effect on the relationship between the child and either
biological parent .... .
16. VA, CODE ANN. § 55-49.1 (Supp. 1987).
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D. The Family Allowance17
Section 64.1-151.1, the family allowance provision, was added to
the Code in 1981 as a part of a comprehensive act designed to re-
spond to the immediate economic needs of the surviving spouse
and minor children of a deceased Virginia domiciliary. The pur-
pose of the family allowance is to provide for the maintenance of
the surviving spouse and minor children whom the decedent was
obligated to support by awarding them a "reasonable allowance in
money" from the decedent's estate during the probate period. 8 A
problem arose in this area of the law in 1986 when a circuit court
ruled that a surviving spouse was not entitled to a family allow-
ance unless the decedent was also survived by a minor child. 19 This
problem has been eliminated by the 1987 amendment to section
64.1-151.1 which provides that "[i]f there are no minor children,
the allowance is payable to the surviving spouse."20
E. Payment of Small Accounts in Savings and Loan
Associations2"
Section 6.1-194.58 is a probate avoidance statute that allows a
savings and loan association to pay out the balance of a decedent's
account to certain persons if (i) the account does not exceed
$5,000, (ii) sixty days have passed since the account owner's death,
and (iii) there has been no qualification on the decedent's estate.
Prior to July 1, 1986, the permissible payees under this statute
were the decedent's spouse or, if none, the decedent's next of kin.22
Other statutes provide remedies for accounts in banks or trust
companies,2 3 and credit unions.24
The 1986 session of the General Assembly intended to modify all
of these statutes by striking the secondary provision, "to his or her
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-151.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
18. The family allowance is limited to one year if the decedent's estate is insolvent; other-
wise it continues until the probate process is completed. The background of the family al-
lowance will be found in Johnson, Support of the Surviving Spouse and Minor Children in
Virginia: Proposed Legislation v. Present Law, 14 U. RICH. L. REv. 639 (1980). A further
discussion of the family allowance section can be found in Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Es-
tates, 68 VA. L. REV. 521, 522-23 (1982).
19. In re Estate of Hess, 8 Va. Cir. 256 (Roanoke 1986).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-151.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-194.58 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 6.1-71 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
24. Id. § 6.1-208.4 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
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next of kin," and replacing it with "to the distributees of the dece-
dent or other persons entitled thereto under the laws of this Com-
monwealth."25 However, the 1986 legislation also inadvertantly de-
leted the primary provision in favor of the decedent's "spouse"
from the savings and loan section. The 1987 session corrects this
error by restoring the spouse as the primary beneficiary in section
6.1-194.58.
F. Payment of Small Trust or Estate Sums to Persons Entitled26
Section 64.1-123.3 was enacted by the 1985 session of the Gen-
eral Assembly to facilitate probate avoidance where an amount not
exceeding $5,000 is due a decedent from a trust fund. In such a
case, if there has been no qualification on the decedent's estate
within sixty days after death, this section provides that the trustee
"may pay such sum to the distributees of the decedent or other
person entitled thereto under the laws of this Commonwealth. '27
The 1987 amendment broadens the scope of this section by ex-
tending the same remedy, under the same conditions, to those
cases where the sum is due to a decedent from the personal repre-
sentative of another decedent's estate.
G. Disbursements and Accountings in Small Estates28
Section 8.01-606, dealing with the payment of small amounts to
certain persons through a court without the intervention of a fidu-
ciary, and the parallel authority of commissioners of accounts, has
been amended (i) to increase the ceiling applicable to circuit courts
from $4,000 to $5,000 in all cases, (ii) to increase the ceiling appli-
cable to commissioners of accounts from $4,000 to $5,000 when
dealing with wills that authorize distributions to incompetents or
infants without the intervention of a guardian or committee, and
(iii) to authorize circuit courts to exempt fiduciaries from filing
further accounts when the funds being administered do not exceed
$5,000.
25. See id.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-123.3 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
27. Id.
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-606 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
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H. Waiver of Probate Fees and Requirements for Small
Estates29
Section 26-12.3 formerly provided that when an estate does not
exceed $500, and an heir, beneficiary or creditor whose claim ex-
ceeds the value of the estate seeks to qualify as personal represen-
tative, the clerk shall waive (i) payment of tax ° or court costs
upon such qualification, (ii) inventory under section 26-12,3' and
(iii) settlement under section 26-17.sl The 1987 amendment raises
the ceiling in this section from $500 to $5,000.
I. Commissioner's Authority-Fiduciary Bonds33
Section 26-2, which requires commissioners of accounts to ex-
amine and report on bonds and whether fiduciaries should be re-
moved, has been amended to further provide that:
When any fiduciary of an estate has given a bond to the court and
then absconds with or improperly disburses any or all of the assets
of the estate, the commissioner may petition the court in which the
order was made conferring his authority on the fiduciary, and ask
the court to order that such bond be forfeited.3 4
J. Postmarital Contracts35
The 1985 session of the General Assembly enacted a Premarital
Agreement Act (the "Act")3 6 which, after its required reenactment
by the 1986 session, (i) applies to all premarital agreements exe-
cuted on or after July 1, 1986, and (ii) validates premarital agree-
ments made prior to that time if they are otherwise valid as con-
tracts.3 7 The Act provides, inter alia, that spouses may contract
with respect to (i) the disposition of property upon death, and
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-12.3 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
30. It is unclear how this provision for the clerk's waiver of "tax" is affected by VA. CODE
ANN. § 58.1-1712 (Cum. Supp. 1987), which imposes a tax "on the probate of every will or
grant of administration not exempt by law," and also provides that "the tax imposed by this
section shall not apply to decedents' estates of $500 or less in value." Id.
31. Id. § 26-12 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
32. Id. § 26-17 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-2 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
34. Id.
35, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-155 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
36. Id. §§ 20-147 to -154 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
37. A discussion of the Premarital Agreement Act is found in Swisher & Bucur, Domestic
Relations: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 731 (1985).
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(ii) the making of a will, trust or other arrangement to carry out
the provisions of the agreement."s
The increasing publicity concerning the topic of premarital
agreements has caused many persons who are already married to
inquire about the possibility of will contracts, and other forms of
postmarital agreements to settle their property rights upon death.
Although the existence of the basic right to enter into postmarital
agreements for such purposes has been clear, 39 the permissible
scope of these agreements and the remedies in connection with
their breach has not.
The 1987 session remedied this problem in a very straightfor-
ward manner by enacting section 20-155 to provide that married
persons can contract with each other concerning their property
rights (i) to the same extent, (ii) with the same effect, and (iii)
subject to the same conditions as can persons who are engaged to
be married. This approach of incorporating by reference the provi-
sions of the Premarital Agreement Act, in addition to the obvious
equitable argument, has the additional merits of statutory econ-
omy and ease of understanding on the part of the attorney and the
consumer.
K. Acts Barring Property Rights40
The 1981 session of the General Assembly enacted an expanded
"anti-slayer's act" in order to more completely prevent a person
who has wrongfully killed another from succeeding to the property
of the victim or in any way benefiting from the wrongful killing.41
Unfortunately, this 1981 legislation perpetuated one of the
problems of the predecessor statute because it narrowly defined
the term "slayer" as a "person who is convicted of the murder of
the decedent. '42 Because of this narrow definition, there continued
to be no statutory remedy43 in those cases where the killer was
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-150 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
39. Harlan v. Weatherly, 183 Va. 49, 31 S.E.2d 263 (1944).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-401 (Supp. 1987).
41. A discussion of this expanded "anti slayer's act" is found in Johnson, Wills, Trusts,
and Estates, 68 VA. L. REv. 521, 525-28 (1982).
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-401 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
43. Notwithstanding the absence of a statutory remedy, the common-law remedy of con-
structive trust may still be available. Although decided under a prior statute, the case of
Sundin v. Klein, 221 Va. 232, 269 S.E.2d 787 (1980), cert. denied sub nom. Cross v. Sundin,
452 U.S. 911 (1981), will be helpful in determining whether the Virginia Supreme Court will
regard the statutory remedy in the new act as exclusive or merely cumulative with existing
common law.
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only charged with manslaughter or, though charged with murder,
(i) died prior to being convicted, (ii) was convicted of a lesser in-
cluded offense, (iii) was acquitted because, even though clearly
guilty by a preponderance of the evidence, guilt could not be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, (iv) plea-bargained a guilty
plea in return for a reduced charge, or (v) was acquitted on the
grounds of temporary insanity.
The 1987 amendment to section 55-401 responds to some of
these considerations by expanding the definition of "slayer" to also
include any person "in the absence of such conviction and where
such person has not been acquitted and is not available for prose-
cution by reason of his death by suicide or otherwise, who is deter-
mined by a court of appropriate jurisdiction by a preponderance of
the evidence to have murdered the decedent."'4 The amendment
further provides that one seeking to establish that a decedent was
murdered by such a person will have the burden of proof on the
issue.
L. Springing Powers of Attorney45
As the statistical lifespan of the average American continues to
increase, so also the incidence of mental incompetence can be ex-
pected to increase in the future. It is also being recognized that
mental incompetence is not confined to the elderly as is often as-
sumed. Like death, incompetence can come (i) at any age, (ii) due
to illness or accidental injury, and (iii) without any prior warning.
This increasing awareness on the part of both lawyer and con-
sumer has led to an increased demand for powers of attorney to be
used on a client's behalf if it becomes necessary. However, many
lawyers have regularly drafted powers of attorney for their clients
that were designed to become effective immediately upon delivery
to the client's agent, instead of becoming effective "if and when"
the client becomes incompetent. These lawyers have been reluctant
to draw powers of attorney that were designed to come into legal
existence at some time in the future when, by definition, the prin-
cipal would be lacking in capacity to appoint an agent.
This legal uncertainty has been laid to rest by new section 11-9.4
which authorizes springing powers of attorney if the document in
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-401 (Supp. 1987).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-9.4 (Cure. Supp. 1987).
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question expressly provides that it will be effective only upon "(i) a
specified future date, (ii) the occurrence of a specified future event
or (iii) the existence of a specified condition which may occur in
the future."'4" A further problem that has been presented by
springing powers is convincing a third party that the condition at-
tached to the power has actually occurred. Section 11-9.4 responds
to this concern by further providing that "[i]n the absence of ac-
tual knowledge to the contrary, any person to whom such writing is
presented shall be entitled to rely on an affidavit, executed by the
attorney in fact or agent, setting forth that such event has oc-
curred or condition exists. '47
Although this is good legislation, it still does not eliminate the
concern of clients who do not wish a particular person to have a
presently exercisable power. It would seem that such a client may
really be saying that the person in question does not have the cli-
ent's complete trust and confidence. If that is the case, it is sub-
mitted that the correct solution to the problem is not the use of a
springing power but the selection of another person to serve as the
client's agent.
M. Provision for Burial of Ward or Ward's Spouse4 8
Section 37.1-142, dealing with the preservation, management,
and gifts of a ward's estate by a court-appointed fiduciary, has
been amended to provide that the fiduciary:
may transfer assets of a ward or a ward's estate into an irrevocable
trust where such transfer has been designated solely for burial of the
ward or spouse of the ward in accordance with conditions set forth
in § 32.1-325(2)"9 and may also contractually bind a ward or a ward's
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-142 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
49. The Code requires the State Board of Medical Assistance Services to include in its
state plan for medical assistance services pursuant to title XIX of the United States Social
Security Act the following:
A provision for determining eligibility for benefits which disregards any transfer of
assets into an irrevocable trust where such transfer has been designated solely for
burial of the transferor or his spouse. The amount transferred into the irrevocable
trust together with the face value of life insurance and any other irrevocable funeral
arrangements shall not exceed $2,000 prior to July 1, 1988, and shall not exceed
$2,500 after July 1, 1988.
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-325(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
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estate by executing a contract described in § 11-245o for the benefit
of the ward.
N. Marital Deduction-Constructional Rules51
Prior to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA),52 the
maximum marital deduction allowed under federal estate tax law
was limited to the larger of $250,000 or one-half of the decedent's
adjusted gross estate. As Congress knew that many pre-ERTA doc-
uments were drafted in formula language referring to the "maxi-
mum marital deduction," ERTA contained a transitional rule
preventing its unlimited marital deduction provisions from apply-
ing to such documents unless they were amended after September
12, 1981 "to refer specifically to an unlimited marital deduction."
Absent such an amendment, the transitional rule provided that
these pre-ERTA documents would be deemed to refer to the pre-
ERTA marital deduction unless governing state law was amended
to provide a contrary result. The 1982 session of the General As-
sembly enacted section 64.1-62.1 as a parallel constructional rule,
mutatis mutandis, to govern the rights of beneficiaries claiming
under these same pre-ERTA documents.
In recognition of the fact that some drafters use formula lan-
guage other than "maximum marital deduction," the 1987 amend-
ment to section 64.1-62.1 provides an additional constructional
rule for non-specifically-amended, pre-ERTA documents that con-
tain a formula providing for "the maximum amount of property
qualifying for the marital deduction allowable under federal law,
but no more than will reduce such federal estate tax to zero or any
other pecuniary or fractional share of property determined with
reference to the marital deduction." 53 In such a case the amend-
ment provides that the beneficiaries' rights will be determined as if
the decedent had died and the computation in question had been
calculated on December 31, 1981.
Lastly, section 64.1-62.1 was amended to provide that (i) its sev-
eral constructional rules will not apply if the decedent had a con-
50. This Code section, entitled "Delivery of goods or merchandise; execution of contracts;
money or other consideration to be held in trust; acknowledgment and recordation," deals
with a variety of considerations relating to burial contracts. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-24 (Cum.
Supp. 1987).
51. VA. CODE: ANN. § 64.1-62.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
52. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-62.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 1987).
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trary intent, (ii) that any proceeding to determine the existence of
a contrary intent must be filed within twelve months following the
decedent's death, and (iii) any such proceeding may be filed by the
personal representative or any affected beneficiary under the will
or other instrument.
0. Virginia Estate Tax Lien54
Section 58.1-908 of the Virginia Estate Tax Act previously pro-
vided for a lien to arise automatically upon the Virginia property
of a nonresident decedent having a taxable estate, while a lien on
the Virginia property of a resident decedent having a taxable es-
tate would arise only upon the filing of a memorandum in the ap-
propriate clerk's office by the Department of Taxation. The 1987
amendment to section 58.1-908 ends the discriminatory treatment
of nonresident decedents and provides that no lien will arise
against any decedent's estate until the Department of Taxation
has filed the required memorandum in the appropriate clerk's
office.
P. Declarations of Estimated Tax for Trusts and Estates56
Several amendments have been made to Code section 58.1-490.
First, the fiduciary of every estate (except for taxable years ending
less than two years after the decedent's death) and every trust
must file a declaration of its estimated tax for every taxable year, if
its Virginia taxable income can reasonably be expected to exceed
$400. Second, any overpayment of estimated taxes must be re-
funded to the fiduciary and cannot be taken as a credit by a bene-
ficiary on the beneficiary's individual return. Third, any reference
to an "individual" in the estimated tax provisions of the Code is
deemed to include a fiduciary required to file a declaration for an
estate or trust.5 7 Section 58.1-493 has also been amended to pro-
vide that the required declaration of estimated tax is to be filed
with the commissioner of revenue for the jurisdiction where the
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-908 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
55. The "appropriate office" for a lien on the personal estate of the decedent is the clerk's
office of the county or city wherein the decedent resided, and for real estate it is the clerk's
office of the county or city wherein such real estate is located. Id. § 58.1-908(A)(2).
56. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-490, -493 (Cum. Supp. 1987). The reader will note that
§ 58.1-490 is set out twice, and reference in this article is made to the second version, effec-
tive for taxable years beginning on and after January 1, 1988.
57. Id. § 58.1-490.
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fiduciary qualified or, if there is no Virginia qualification, in the
city or county where the fiduciary resides, does business or has an
office, or where any of the beneficiaries reside. All of these amend-
ments are effective for taxable years beginning on or after January
1, 1988.58
Q. Generation Skipping Tax5"
Section 58.1-936 imposes a pick-up tax on certain generation-
skipping transfers that is keyed into the federal credit allowable
for state taxes on generation-skipping transfers. The 1987 amend-
ments to section 58.1-936 are for conformance purposes following
the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, to change the reference
to the federal statute from Internal Revenue Code section 2602 to
Internal Revenue Code section 2604, and to state the section's ap-
plicability to transfers occurring after October 22, 1986.
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Adopted Persons Taking Under Wills
In Hyman v. Glover, ° the relevant portion of the testatrix' will
gave a share of her estate to each of her children "and one share to
the issue of each deceased child of mine, such issue to take, collec-
tively, per stirpes, the share of their deceased ancestor." 1 The trial
court held that, under section 64.1-71.1,62 "[t]he word 'issue,'
standing alone, now includes persons who qualify by or through
adoption. ' 63 Accordingly, the trial court granted an adopted grand-
daughter's motion for summary judgment that she was entitled to
the one-fifth share of her deceased father in the testatrix' estate.
The Virginia Supreme Court's 4-3 decision reversing the trial court
concluded "that Code § 64.1-71.1 does not operate to include
adopted children within the meaning of the word 'issue.' If the
General Assembly intends for adopted children to be included in
the word 'issue,' it must say So.''64 In response to this decision, the
58. Id. § 58.1-493.
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-936 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
60. 232 Va. 140, 348 S.E.2d 269 (1986). Although not originally associated with this case,
the author became co-counsel for appellee in the petition for rehearing.
61. Id. at 141, 348 S.E.2d at 270.
62. The relevant language of this section, as it existed at testatrix' death, is reproduced in
the text following note 2, supra.
63. Glover, 232 Va. at 142, 348 S.E.2d at 270.
64. Id. at 147, 348 S.E.2d at 273.
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1987 session of the General Assembly enacted a clarifying amend-
ment to section 64.1-71.1 which reads as follows:
In determining the intent of a testator or settlor, adopted persons
are presumptively included in such terms as "children,' "issue,"
"kindred," "heirs," "relatives," "descendants" or similar words of
classification and are presumptively excluded by such terms as "nat-
ural children," "issue of the body," "blood kindred," "heirs of the
body," "blood relatives," "decendents of the body" [sic] or similar
words of classification. 5
Although this 1987 legislation addresses the primary issue raised
by the Glover decision, eliminating the need for extended discus-
sion of the case, there is one point that needs to be noted because
of its possible impact on the construction of statutes dealing with
adopted persons in the future. In one part of its opinion, the ma-
jority states that "[g]iven the common law meaning of the word
'issue,' any statute enacted to change that meaning would necessa-
rily be in derogation of the common law. . .[and] 'statutes'in der-
ogation of the common law are to be strictly construed .... ."66
This language should be contrasted with the Court's language in
Fletcher v. Flanary,67 stating:
The right to adopt children was unknown to the common law and
is probably inherited from the civil law of Rome. Since it is not in
derogation of the common law, the strict construction of statutes
which hinge upon that system are not to be applied. With us the
entire field of adoption is covered by statute.
Since these statutes confer a beneficial interest they are to be lib-
erally construed, particularly in a contest between the adopted son
and the estate of his intestate foster parents, to a less extent when
the contest is between the adopted son and the estate of some re-
mote ancestor by adoption."
Although the Fletcher case was cited in the Glover majority opin-
ion,69 it was cited on another issue, and the majority opinion ap-
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-71.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987). A complete discussion of this clarifying
amendment is found supra part A at notes 1-11.
66. Glover, 232 Va. at 143, 348 S.E.2d at 271 (citations omitted).
67. 185 Va. 409, 38 S.E.2d 433 (1946).
68. Id. at 411-12, 38 S.E.2d at 434.
69. 232 Va. at 143, 348 S.E.2d at 271 (citing Fletcher, 185 Va. at 415, 38 S.E.2d at 435).
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pears to be unaware of this aspect of the prior decision in the
Fletcher case.
B. Construction of "Nearest Living Paternal Kindred"
In Elmore v. Virginia National Bank,7 ° the relevant portion of
the settlor's trust agreement identified her ultimate takers as "the
nearest living paternal kindred of the Grantor."'71 The grantor was
survived by two paternal first cousins. Three other paternal first
cousins predeceased the grantor but were survived by issue who
claimed that they were entitled to their deceased parent's share.
Although the issue would have been so entitled under intestate
succession principles, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded
that "'kindred' is not a highly technical term whose primary
meaning is determined by reference to the statute of descent and
distribution. It is similar to the phrase 'next of kin,' which we have
held is a nontechnical term whose commonly accepted meaning is
'nearest in blood.' ,,72
The court's construction in the instant case was further rein-
forced by the fact that the trust instrument contained a reference
to the statute of descent and distribution in another provision that
preceded the provision in question by only two sentences. The
court concluded that this reference "demonstrates that the drafter
of the instrument understood the import of the chosen language
and intended to accomplish a different result. '73 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the trial court's holding that the term "nearest liv-
ing paternal kindred" was clear and unambiguous, and that the
two surviving first cousins were the sole takers thereunder.
C. Surviving Spouse as "Heir at Law"
In Carter v. King, 4 the relevant language of a testamentary
trust, created in 1920, provided for a life estate in one person "with
remainder to her heirs at law, to be determined as of the date of
her death. '75 Upon the life tenant's death in 1982, she was sur-
70. 232 Va. 310, 350 S.E.2d 603 (1986). The author served as co-counsel for appellants in
this case.
71. Id. at 312, 350 S.E.2d at 605.
72. Id. at 314, 350 S.E.2d at 606.
73. Id. at 315, 350 S.E.2d at 607.
74. 233 Va. 60, 353 S.E.2d 738 (1987).
75. Id. at 61, 353 S.E.2d at 739.
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vived by her second husband and by two children of her first mar-
riage. The issue before the court was the correctness of the trial
court's holding that decedent's surviving husband was not an "heir
at law" of decedent within the meaning of section 64.1_1.76 On July
1, 1982, twenty-five days before decedent's death, newly-amended
section 64.1-1 became effective and identified the first category of
heirs as follows:
First. To the surviving spouse of the intestate, unless the intestate is
survived by children or their descendants, one or more of whom are
not children or their descendants of the surviving spouse, in which
case such estate shall pass to the intestate's children and their de-
scendants subject to the provisions of § 64.1-19. 77
This statutory language clearly identifies a decedent's surviving
spouse as the sole heir (i) if the decedent leaves no surviving de-
scendants, or (ii) if all of the decedent's surviving descendants are
also descendants of the decedent's surviving spouse. However, the
court held that "a surviving spouse is not an heir of the decedent
when, as here, 'the intestate is survived by children or their de-
scendants, one or more of whom are not children or their descend-
ants of the surviving spouse.' ",78 In such a case the intestate's heirs
are the intestate's children or their descendants, to whom the dece-
dent's realty descends subject to the surviving spouse's dower or
curtesy rights under section 64.1-19. Although dower and curtesy
rights were increased from a life estate in one-third to a fee simple
estate in one-third in 1977, the court saw the increase as relating
only to that interest's dimensions, as opposed to its character, and
thus "reject[ed] the suggestion that the General Assembly in-
tended the amendment to convert dower or curtesy, a marital
right, into a right of inheritance. ''79
76. "The parties agree that. . . the question whether a surviving spouse is an heir at law
in this Commonwealth is governed by the provisions of Code § 64.1-1 and related statutes in
effect on the date of the decedent's death." Carter, 233 Va. at 61, 353 S.E.2d at 739.
77. This section of the Code provides that:
A surviving spouse shall be entitled to a dower or curtesy interest in fee simple of one
third of all the real estate whereof the deceased spouse or any other to his use was at
any time seized during coverture of an estate of inheritance, unless such right shall
have been lawfully barred or relinquished.
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
78. Carter, 233 Va. at 63, 353 S.E.2d at 740.
79. Id.
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D. Contract Execution Prevents Later Disclaimer
In Niklason v. Ramsey,80 the decedent's will was challenged on
the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity. The parties to the
suit, including the decedent's son, entered into an agreement to
invalidate the will and divide the estate. The decedent's son then
purported to disclaim his interest in his mother's estate.
Two of the son's judgment creditors challenged the disclaimer as
invalid under Code section 64.1-194 which. provides that "[a]ny
.. . assignment, conveyance, encumbrance, pledge or transfer of
property or interest therein or contract therefor . . . bars the right
to disclaim as to the property or interest."'" In affirming the trial
court's decision finding the disclaimer ineffective, the Virginia Su-
preme Court said that "by contracting away whatever interest [the
son] may have had in his mother's estate, [he] exercised dominion
over her estate contrary to the language of Code § 64.1-194.82
E. Joint Account Funds Used to Purchase Treasury Bills
In Bennet v. First & Merchants National Bank,83 the Virginia
Supreme Court considered whether the ownership of a United
States Treasury Bill purchased with joint account funds is deter-
mined by section 6.1-125.5.1"
In Bennet, a father (Butler) and daughter (Mindy) opened a sur-
vivorship joint bank account, funded by Butler's money. At But-
ler's request, Mindy took the passbook to the bank and purchased
a six-month $100,000 Treasury Bill. The "Security Buy Memo"
listed Butler as "customer," and Mindy as "co-owner." The inter-
nal bank records listed the purchase as "for the account of Taylor
Scott Butler." Butler died before the Treasury Bill matured. After
Butler's death, the bank corrected its records to show the purchase
"as agent" for "Taylor Scott Butler or Mindy Thompson." The
80. 233 Va. 161, 353 S.E.2d 783 (1987).
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-194 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
82. Niklason, 233 Va. at 164, 353 S.E.2d at 784.
83. 233 Va. 355, 355 S.E.2d 888 (1987).
84. The Code provides, insofar as relevant to this, that "[s]ums remaining on deposit at
the death of a party to a joint account belong to the surviving party or parties as against the
estate of the decedent unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention
at the time the account is created." VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.5(A) (Repl. Vol. 1983). The
background to this legislation will be found in Johnson, Joint Totten Trust, and P.O.D.
Bank Accounts: Virginia Law Compared to the Uniform Probate Code, 8 U. RICH. L. REv.
41 (1973).
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bank's practice was to debit its customer's account upon the
purchase of Treasury Bills. 5
The Virginia Supreme Court first noted that Code section
6.1-125.5(A), dealing with survivorship in joint accounts, was not
applicable to the case because the relationship between the deposi-
tor (Butler) and the United States government was not an "ac-
count" as that term is defined in the Code.s6 The Code's definition
of "account" required a debtor-creditor relationship between a de-
positor and the financial institution. The court concluded that the
only debtor-creditor relationship with respect to the Treasury Bill
was between the bank and the government.8 7
Furthermore, the court noted that section 55-2088 abolishes the
common-law right of survivorship between joint tenants except
"'when it manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument
that it was intended the part of the one dying should then belong
to the others.' "89 There was no evidence in the case applicable to
this exception.
The court also considered Butler's ownership of the bank ac-
count prior to and at the time the funds were withdrawn. It was
clear to the court that pursuant to section 6.1-125.3(A),9 ° the funds
belonged solely to Butler. The court said that it was established
Virginia law that "[a]ny asset purchased with his funds at his di-
rection is presumed to be his sole property in the absence of evi-
dence that it was intended to be the subject of a gift, or unless he
made a different disposition by contract."'" The presumption was
not rebutted. Thus, the court reversed the trial court's decision
that the Treasury Bill was excluded from Butler's estate by virtue
of survivorship.2
85. Bennet, 233 Va. 355, 355 S.E.2d 888.
86. 233 Va. at 360, 355 S.E.2d at 890-91. For purposes of multiple party accounts,
§ 6.1-125.1(1) defines an "account" as "a contract of deposit of funds between a depositor
and a financial institution, and includes a checking account, savings account, certificate of
deposit, share account, and other like arrangement." VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.1(1) (Repl.
Vol. 1983); see also id. §§ 6.1-125.1 to 125.16.
87. Bennet, 233 Va. at 360, 355 S.E.2d at 891.
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
89. Bennet, 233 Va. at 360, 355 S.E.2d at 891 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 55-21 (Repl. Vol.
1986)).
90. The Code provides, insofar as relevant to these facts, that "[a] joint account belongs,
during the lifetimes of all parties, to the parties in proportion to the net contributions by
each to the sums on deposit .... " VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-125.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
91. Bennet, 233 Va. at 361, 355 S.E.2d at 891.
92. Id.
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